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comments on earlier versions of this research.Abstract:  Latin American countries are generally characterized as displaying high income
and earnings inequality overall along with high inequality by gender, race, and ethnicity.
However, the latter phenomenon is not a major contributor to the former phenomenon.  Using
household survey data from four Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, and
Guyana), we demonstrate (using Theil index decompositions as well as Gini indices, and
90/10 and 50/10 percentile comparisons) that within-group inequality rather than between-
group inequality is the main contributor to overall inequality.  Multi-stage simulations in
which the relatively disadvantaged gender and/or racial/ethnic group is treated more and
more as if it were the relatively advantaged group tend to reduce overall inequality measures
only slightly and in some cases have the effect of increasing inequality measures.
JEL Codes: D3, I3, J15
Keywords:  earnings inequality, income inequality, gender, race, and ethnicity differences1
Latin American countries are generally characterized as exhibiting both high wage and
earnings inequality—and significant gender, racial, and ethnic-related inequality.  Hence an
interesting question to ask is to what extent these two features are interrelated.
In this paper we address this question by considering how greater equality by gender and
race/ethnicity in distribution of earnings would affect overall earnings inequality.  Using recent
household survey data from four countries for which it is possible to calculate earnings
separately by race (Brazil and Guyana) or ethnicity (Bolivia and Guatemala), we calculate a
number of inequality indexes, both overall and separately by race/ethnicity and gender.  We
show that there is significant gender and intraracial/ethnic group earnings inequality as well as
substantial overall earnings inequality.
We then recalculate the overall inequality index under a series of assumptions that
increasingly treat members of the worse-off gender and/or racial/ethnic group as if they were
members of the better-off group.  We show that these steps do not have a large effect in reducing
overall inequality measures, and indeed can increase inequality measures in some cases.  This is
not surprising, given the high levels of intragroup inequality that we have shown and the many
unobservable factors that affect wages.  However, this may be surprising to those who have not
seen these intragroup measures previously.
Hence this paper both contributes new empirical results from these so-far rarely utilized
household surveys, and presents a new angle regarding the causes of inequality and potential
consequences of race/ethnic-related anti-discrimination policy measures.
Below we first present the baseline inequality measures for the four countries.  We also
consider conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions to indicate how much of earnings2
differences by race/ethnicity/gender is related to differences in characteristics between the
comparable “better-off” groups and how much is related to differences in treatment.
We then describe and implement an extension to the Blinder-Oaxaca methodology,
developed by Bourguignon et al. (1998) and implemented in Bourguignon et al. (2002).  Herein
we consider how various characteristics are generated and simulate these processes before
simulating or decomposing earnings.  For example, if education is assumed to be generated
differently by race/ethnicity/gender, we allow education to be generated for the worse-off group
by the process associated with the better-off group, and then use predicted education in place of
actual education in simulating earnings for the worse-off group.
We then compare our actual earnings inequality measures to inequality measures
calculated using the simulated earnings data for the worse-off group.  We show that this
simulation has little effect on overall inequality in the majority of cases.  Instead, within-group
inequality persists and drives the over-all inequality.  In the conclusion, we consider briefly what
implications our findings have regarding the efficacy of anti-discrimination policy and
affirmative action policies in reducing overall earnings inequality.
Patterns of earnings inequality
While it is quite common to find commentaries mentioning the extent of inequality by
gender, race, and ethnicity in Latin America, along with decrying the overall extent of inequality,
it is far less common to see a formal analysis of to what extent the former is responsible, or in
any way linked, to the latter.  Psacharapoulos and Patrinos (1994) have tackled the estimation of
racially and/or ethnically separate earnings equations for Latin American countries and
attempted to measure the contribution of racial and ethnic differences to earnings differences.  In3
addition, in the earnings equation decomposition literature, it is rare to see any reaggregation of
the data into a measure of overall earnings inequality in order to be able to see how various
counterfactual calculations might affect such a measure.
It is particularly difficult to study the differential patterns of earnings inequality by
race/ethnicity across all of the Latin American and Caribbean countries because many Censuses
and labor force or household surveys do not ask questions delineating race (Florenz, Medina, and
Urrea 2001).  We surveyed the most recent available household surveys for these countries and
came up with four in which we had both sufficient coding to be able to separate out “dominant”
and “disadvantaged” groups by race/ethnicity and sufficient sample sizes to be able to estimate
separate earnings regressions by gender and race/ethnicity.  These are the 1999 Encuesta
Continua de Hogares for Bolivia, the 1996 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra da Domicilio for
Brazil, the 2000 Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida for Guatemala, and the 1999
Survey of Living Conditions for Guyana.  These countries all have either sizable Afro-descendant
or Indigenous populations, with Brazil and Guyana having the two highest percentage Afro-
descendant populations (44.7% and 42.6% respectively) and Bolivia and Guatemala having the
two largest reported indigenous populations (71% and 66% respectively) in Central and South
America.  Guyana is also interesting in that the “dominant” population is of South Indian
background rather than white background (in contrast to the other three countries).  So while we
use the term “white” as shorthand to refer to the dominant group in each society, the dominant
group in Guyana is not actually white, and in each society the nondominant group varies in its
composition (ranging from more Afro-descendant dominated in Brazil and Guyana, to
indigenous group-dominated in Bolivia and Guatemala).4
Table 1 displays various measures of hourly earnings inequality for these four countries,
overall and by gender-racial/ethnic group.
1  We utilize the Gini index, the Theil (1) and (0)
indexes, and ratios of 90/10 and 50/10 points in the income distribution to describe earnings
inequality.
We see that, with the notable exception of Guyana, earnings inequality is quite high
measured by any of these standards.  But notably, inequality is not only high overall, but also
within each of the four gender-racial/ethnic groups.  This is the first thing to notice in thinking
about how both race/ethnicity and gender relate to overall inequality.  Also, no one racial-gender
or ethnic-gender group is the most unequal consistently across the sample.  While the most
unequal wage distribution in Brazil is that of white men, Indo-women have the largest inequality
in earnings in Guyana and indigenous women tend to have the highest earnings inequality in
Bolivia and Guatemala.
Table 2 shows the results from standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of log earnings,
comparing in turn men and women within race, whites and nonwhites within gender, and white
men to nonwhite women.  Appendix Table A-1 contains the full regression results used to create
this decomposition.  The surveys vary in sample size, availability of data, and goodness of fit of
the earnings equations (as can be seen in Table A-1).  However, some points are of note across
all four countries, namely the constancy of positive returns to higher educational attainment, and
a traditional quadratic relationship between age and earnings that is remarkably similar across
the four countries.  Women tend to receive a relatively higher payoff from economic attainment
than do men (with the notable exception of white women in Guatemala).  There are positive
                                                
1 Note that while we subdivide by gender that is not our primary focus in this paper, as a full accounting of gender-
related differentials is a topic in and of itself.  However it would be inappropriate to ignore gender differences in
estimating earnings equations as it is well-known that their form differs substantially by gender; hence we estimate
earnings equations separately for each gender within a racial/ethnic division throughout this paper.5
relationships to earnings of being in urban rather than rural settings, and having employment in a
relatively more formal sector.
Turning to the results of the wage decomposition as shown in Table 2, Guyana has
noticeably small wage differentials by race/ethnicity, while Bolivia has the smallest wage
differential by gender within the dominant group and Guatemala has the widest gender
differentials.  Notably, while racial/ethnic differences (controlling for gender) have a large
characteristics component, gender differences (controlling for race/ethnicity) have a large
differences-in-treatment component.  Indeed, women’s characteristics in both Bolivia and Brazil
(and in Guyana for Afro-origin women) would contribute to lowered earnings inequality if it
were not for the offsetting effects of differences in coefficients.  While the “endowed”
differences between races/ethnicities are by region and education, the differences between men
and women are primarily in employment position.  The difference in wages by race/ethnicity that
can be attributed to returns to endowments (i.e., the differences in coefficients) is primarily due
to education.  The returns to education are also important for explaining the gender wage gap,
but returns to other factors also emerge as important.
A focus on decompositions such as provided in Table 2 makes it appear as though
earnings differences would decline notably if differences in treatment (i.e., differences in
coefficients) were eradicated, and also that race/ethnicity differences would diminish
substantially in all countries save Guyana if differences in characteristics were narrowed.
However, neither or these measures necessarily translates into substantially reduced overall
earnings inequality.  Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are decompositions at the mean
characteristic values for the sample and do not give good insight about the full differential
distributions of characteristic values in each subsample.  Differences in characteristic6
distributions within each subsample generate the within subsample earnings differences that we
observe in Table 1.  Therefore, even if mean characteristics were equalized within each group as
well as treatment of those characteristics, substantial overall earnings inequality could still exist
in the society because of the spread in characteristics—and potentially in returns to
characteristics—within groups.  In the next section we consider how to simulate both more equal
characteristic distributions and more equal treatment and how these simulations would affect
measures of overall earnings inequality.
Simulating more equal treatment to assess its effects on overall earnings inequality
In this section we move beyond the simple Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework in
two ways:  1) by expanding the wage equation estimation to incorporate estimation of some
characteristics; 2) by simulating wages using firstly the Oaxaca-Blinder framework in which
only returns are equalized, and secondly by using the expanded framework in which both returns
and the processes generating some of the underlying characteristics are equalized, and then
calculating what the earnings inequality indexes look like for the distributions of simulated
wages.
The expansion of the wage equation estimation framework consists of allowing some of
the variables in the earnings equation to be determined by earlier processes that are also
estimated separately by group.  In the Bourguignon et al. (2002) case they also simulate
conditional distributions for occupational choice, education, fertility, and non-labor income.  In
addition, as it is possible that an individual observed in an occupational status without wages
(i.e., self-employed and non-employed persons) needs to be simulated as being in another
occupational status, the random error terms are drawn for the simulations from the counterfactual7
distribution of error terms.
2  Bourguignon et al. apply their method to considering differences in
household income distribution across countries; however, it is readily modifiable to considering
differences in household income distribution—or individual income or earnings
distributions—across demographic groups within a country.
In order to walk through this process, imagine two groups, 1 and 2.  We will simulate
earnings for group 2 under the assumption that they are treated like group 1.
The first step in this process is to estimate education level  for members of group 1 as a
function of age, mother's level of schooling (when available),
3 and region of birth (when
available; alternatively proxy using current geographic location). Then education is simulated for
members of group 2 by using their values for age and mother's level of schooling in the
education equation for group 1 and drawing a randomly generated error term for each group 2
person from a censored double exponential distribution standardized to reflect group 2’s
empirically estimated error term variance.
The second step, for women in group 2 only, is to estimate the number of children for
group 1 as a function of age, mother's level of schooling (when available), region, and education.
Then number of children is simulated for members of group 2 by using their values for age,
mother's level of schooling, and (simulated) education in the fertility equation for group 1 and
drawing a randomly-generated error term for each group 2 person from a censored double
exponential distribution standardized to reflect group 2’s estimated error term variance.  For
men, the true number of children in the household is used throughout.
                                                
2 See Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (1998) for more exact details on how this methodology works.
3 For the Brazilian data, where mother’s level of schooling was available, we also carried out our process with an
additional prior step, namely simulating mother’s level of schooling.  The results from this simulation are not
substantially different from those reported below in the text for Brazil; the main difference is that even less of
overall variance can be attributed to between-group variance once this additional leveling step is taken.8
The third step is to estimate the occupational sector for group 1 as a function of age,
mother's level of schooling (when available), education, household composition, and number of
children.  Then occupational sector is simulated for members of group 2 by using their values for
age, mother's level of schooling, household composition, (simulated) education, and (for women,
simulated) number of children in the household in the occupational choice equation for group 1
and drawing a randomly-generated error term for each group 2 person from a censored double
exponential distribution standardized to reflect group 2’s estimated error term variance.
The fourth step is to estimate earnings for group 1 as a function of age, education,
occupational sector, and region.  Then earnings are simulated for members of group 2 by using
their values for age, (simulated) education, and (simulated) occupational sector in the earnings
equation for group 1, keeping the original error term for each group 2 person but adjusting it by
multiplying it by the ratio of group 1’s variance to group 2’s variance.
4
Steps one through three utilize multinomial logit as the estimation technique as people
fall into distinct groups, while step four utilizes OLS as the estimation technique to deal with the
continuous log earnings distribution.
To summarize in equation format, consider the two equations for earnings Y for groups 1
and 2, with each vector Y expressed as a function of matrices of explanatory variables X and Z,
where the Z-variables are endogenous, and are functions of the matrix of explanatory variables H
(which may contain a subset of the variables in X); all subscripts refer to groups 1 and 2, and an
implicit dimensionality equal to each group’s sample size:
                                                
4 For persons with no earnings originally, their earnings are estimated given the estimating equation and an error
term is drawn for them from a normal distribution with the variance estimated from the data for that country’s
subgroup and then scaled up or down as described in this text sentence.9
Y1 = X1 1 + Z1 1 + 1




î  ï 
Z1 = H1 1 + 1




î  ï 
Where  ,  , and   are coefficients to be estimated and   and   are random error terms.
Then once  ,  , and   are estimated, an estimate of Z2 can be constructed for each
individual, and then of Y2 under the situation where members of group 2 are treated as if they are
members of group 1 (although still subject to the error term variance experienced by group 2):
ˆ  Z  2 = H2
ˆ  d  1 + ˆ  e  2
ˆ  Y  2 = X2
ˆ  b  1 + ˆ  Z  2ˆ  g  1 + ˆ  m  2
The estimation process is represented above as linear, but in fact is estimated as a
multinomial logit.  Note that if Z contains no elements, if X2 is set to the mean values for group 2,
and  ˆ  m  2 is set to zero, then  ˆ  Y  2 corresponds to the standard estimate of what the mean of Y2 would
be if group 2 members were treated like group 1 members, an estimate that is generally used to
perform a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  Otherwise, this method should tend to bring the
simulated earnings distribution for group 2 “closer” to the earnings distribution for group 1.
It is therefore of interest to see how much allowing the past to be changed, i.e., allowing
educational attainment, number of children born, and occupational sector for group 2 to be
determined by processes that are the same as group 1 faces, changes the current earnings
outcome for group 2.  If even this additional movement towards equalization of outcomes does10
not reduce earnings inequality significantly for the country as a whole, then it is difficult to make
the case that earnings inequality is determined in any significant part by differences in treatment
between the groups.
While the four country surveys used herein were chosen in part because they had
relatively good and also relatively similar data available, the specifications are not identical due
to data limitations and coding differences.  The full equations used in the simulation stages are
shown in Appendix Tables A-1 (the final stage OLS earnings equations) and A-3 (the various
multinomial logit results).
The simulations do have real impacts on the Z matrices.  An example of the effect that
these simulations can have is shown in Table 3 for the specific case of estimating number of
children for Afro-Brazilian women if they had the same “process” for the determination of
quantity of children as white Brazilian women.  While in many cases (between 66 and 82 percent
of cases, conditional on the actual number of children) the same number is predicted as is
actually experienced by the particular woman, in a number of other cases the procedure predicts
more or fewer children  (again conditional on the actual number of children and therefore upper
or lower bounded for some women).  Similar results for the estimations of educational
attainment and occupational sector for Brazil can be seen in Appendix Table A-2 (this is in place
of the full multinomial logit results for these estimations, as there are a large number of
coefficients that would need reporting; full results in spreadsheet format are available upon
request).
These simulations are then used to create earnings distributions for the three groups of
white women, nonwhite men, and nonwhite women—while actual earnings are used for white
men.  The simulated wages are used to recalculate the inequality measures in Table 1.11
We would expect that awarding the “prices” that white men face to the other groups and
simulating the characteristics of the other groups to be more similar to those of white men would
lead to within-group inequality that is more similar to that of white men, which is not necessarily
inequality-reducing.  In Table 1, white men had the most unequal income in Brazil, and they
were only behind nonwhite women in terms of inequality levels in Guatemala.  However, the
simulations tend to reduce between-group inequalities, which has the potential to counteract an
increase in within-group inequality in Brazil and Guatemala, for example.
Results for individual earnings inequality measures
Table 4 shows the results from these simulations in terms of how they affect earnings
inequality measures (as shown in the first column of Table 1).  We repeat the actual overall
inequality measures for our samples in the first column, along with the results from two sets of
simulations in the next six columns.  The first set of simulations holds returns to characteristics
constant across the two groups (at the level of the better-off group) but allows characteristics to
vary.  The second set of simulations not only hold returns to characteristics constant across the
two groups, but also simulates characteristics using the technique outlined above.  The first
simulation in each set considers what would happen to the overall earnings distribution if white
and non-white groups are treated the same within gender, while the second simulation considers
what would happen if women are treated like men within each racial/ethnic group. The third
simulation considers what would happen if both women and nonwhites are treated like white
men.
All three simulations within each set are very similar to the original calculations using the
observed data, with some variations depending on the inequality measure used.  The Gini shows12
very small changes, while the Theil indices exhibit similarly very little change.  There are more
noticeable changes in the 90/10 and 50/10 ratios, with reductions in these ratios relative to the
base case in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Guyana, and increases in the Brazilian case.  In general,
simulating equality of both returns to characteristics and characteristics distributions tends to
lead to slightly higher inequality measures (closer to the original unsimulated level) than if only
equality of returns to characteristics is imposed.  However, significant spread remains in all four
countries’ earnings distributions under any of these scenarios (though less so in Guyana, which
had much less spread to begin with).
Starting with the comparison of the original (column a) and the fully simulated wages
(column g), there is little difference in the Ginis, but the Theil and percentile ratios show some
changes.  In Bolivia, inequality falls somewhat, which is likely due to the lowest inequality in
that country being among white men’s wages.  However, white men also had the lowest
inequality in Guyana, but the simulation did not yield lower Ginis in that case.
Equal treatment by race had some effect on the inequality measures.  Column (e) allows
differences by gender to persist, but considers the case in which nonwhite men have
characteristics and skills that are comparable to white men’s and similarly between nonwhite
women and white women.  The inequality values decrease or stay constant in Bolivia, Brazil, and
Guatemala, but increase in Guyana.  This may be due to the much higher inequality among Indo-
Guyanese women as compared to Afro-Guyanese women, thus increasing the Afro-Guyanese
women’s inequality when they are given prices and characteristics that are more similar to Indo-
Guyanese women.
Equal treatment by gender has no effect on the inequality measurements, except for a
slight increase in Brazil (comparing columns f and a).  In Brazil and Bolivia, the simulations13
should have created a clear increase in inequality in Brazil (since men’s wages are more unequal
than women’s wages, regardless of race) and a decrease in Bolivia (since men’s wages are more
equal than women’s).  While the Brazilian simulations do show small changes in the expected
direction, the Bolivian numbers do not show any notable changes.
Within- versus between-group inequality for individual earnings measures
The change in overall inequality, as shown in Table 4, tells us something about the
within-group inequality, but tells us nothing about the extent of wage inequality between
groups—which is the usual concern in group wage differentials—and it does not tell us whether
within-group or between-group inequality is the main culprit in causing high overall inequality.
To examine these two questions, we decompose the two Theil (entropy) indexes into within and
between sections, thereby showing very simply how much of inequality occurs within defined
groups rather than between one or more defined groups.  Such a decomposition is shown in
Table 5 for both the actual and the simulated inequality measures, where the simulations are
again done with either allowing only the betas to be simulated, or both the betas and the
characteristics to be simulated.  We perform both an overall decomposition and decompositions
for various population subgroups, including white and nonwhite men, white and nonwhite
women, white men and women, nonwhite men and women, and white men and nonwhite
women.
For all such decompositions, it is clear that the majority of inequality occurs within rather
than between the population subgroups, reinforcing the patterns found in Table 4.  While there
tends to be more of a “between” effect in comparing racial/ethnic subgroups than in comparing
genders (except for Guyana, where there is little between effect in either set of comparisons), the14
between effect is still dominated by the “within” effect.  In addition, there is little difference in
the decompositions between the actual and simulated earnings comparisons, implying little effect
on overall earnings inequality of equalizing pay structures across groups in comparison to almost
any equalization that might occur within groups.
The virtual absence of effects on the inequality measures of treating everyone like men
may be due to several factors other than the argument that we are implicity advancing, namely
that overall inequality is significant within groups and dwarfs the significance of factors creating
between-group inequality.  First, the goodness of fit of some of the simulation equations was
low, so the extent to which the simulations were able to proxy the white men’s distribution of
particular variables is limited.  Second, and related to the first point, the variables that are used to
simulate the new distribution of explanatory variables are themselves based on processes of
being from a racial, ethnic, or gender group, so the simulations may be picking up the influences
of some group-specific characteristics that the method is intended to purge.  Third, the
regressions omit many variables (due to data unavailability) that may be key to simulating the
distribution of endowments or estimating the rewarding of endowments.  Most notably, the
methodology cannot capture the quality or importance of institutions that drive the observed
differentials, cannot control for differences in preferences, and does not control well for some
variables such as actual labor market experience (generally considered to be a key determinant of
gender wage differentials) or spatial dimensions of inequality that may be key to the ethnic and
racial wage differentials.  Nonetheless, these results are striking in their consistency and size
across both country and simulation technique.
Results for per capita household earnings inequality measures15
All of the results up to this point in the paper have been in comparing individual earnings
rather than either a broader measure of individual income or a broader measure of earnings or
income potentially available to the individual, such as household total earnings or income.
While these data sets do not yield good measures of income for us to use (and indeed, our focus
in this paper is on labor income rather than overall income inequality), we can calculate
household earnings measures to see how our various simulations affect household earnings.
Rather than also simulating different household structures, we standardize our comparisons to a
per capita household earnings basis in the following two tables.  However, this does allow us to
see how per capita household earnings inequality among say, white men, is affected by the
potentially higher (or lower) earnings that their spouses might earn under our various
simulations.  In other words, we can compare available pooled labor earnings for members of our
various gender and racial/ethnic groups rather than simply their individual earnings.  This
involves simulating earnings for individuals in the sample, aggregating them into their actual
households, and then ascribing per capita earnings to each individual by dividing by the number
of people in their household (including nonearning dependents).
Table 6 shows measures comparable to Table 4 calculated for the per capita household
earnings measure.  Household per capita earnings inequality measures are uniformly higher than
the comparable indivudal earnings inequality measures.  And they show more significant
reductions under the various simulations than do individual returns.  Again, simulation of both
returns and characteristics (columns e through g) leads to less decrease in inequality than
simulation of returns alone (columns b through d).
Table 7 shows Theil index decompositions comparable to the first panel of Table 5 using
the per capita household earnings measure, namely for the case in which we observe how overall16
per capita household earnings inequality for the society is affected if everyone is treated like
white men.  Here again you can see the more substantial drop in inequality caused by equalizing
treatment of persons and then pooling them into household earnings pools.  However, the
contribution of between-group inequality to overall inequality remains low (never over fourteen
percent of the total) and drops when either form of simulation is run—though not as substantially
as in the case of individual earnings as shown in Table 5.
Hence the results based on individual earnings inequality can be qualified somewhat to
say that moves to equalize returns and characteristics distributions between gender-racial-ethnic
groups will reduce household per capita earnings inequality measurably, but substantial
inequality remains, and the remaining inequality is (not surprisingly) within-group rather than
between-group inequality.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that within-group, rather than between-group, inequality is
the key factor underlying the high inequality observed in these four Latin American countries.
While between-group differentials have been a primary focus of academics interested in
considering inequality and its causes, reduction of such differentials is not likely to be the key to
diminishing overall inequality, at least in the Latin American context.
We have also shown in this paper that decreasing within-group inequality is quite
difficult, as making adjustments at obvious entry points for such steps has little effect on the
overall wage distribution.  When we simulated rewarding women the same as men, indigenous
the same as non-indigenous, or black the same as white—any or all of which might occur in
affirmative action programs—overall measured inequality changed little.  Similarly, when we17
simulated equalizing endowment accumulation processes among groups, there was again little
change in the overall inequality measures.
These results underscore the extent to which overall inequality in Latin America need not
be particularly linked with treatment or endowment differences between groups.  From a policy
point of view this point has three implications.  First, poverty reduction and/or income
equalization policies do not automatically need to target race or ethnic groups to be effective.
Instead, they can be targeted based on earnings standards alone—since there are poor across all
racial and ethnic groups.  Secondly, anti-discrimination policies, if successful, will not
automatically lead to lower earnings inequality.  It is particularly important to untwine anti-
discrimination policies from inequality reduction policies rather than assuming that the former
will serve as the latter as well.  Third, policies that attempt to equalize earnings-related
characteristics across the whole population, say guaranteeing universal primary and hopefully
also secondary education, may do more to equalize earnings than enforcement of standard anti-
discrimination policies.
These conclusions may be viewed as radical by those who have considered inequality in
Latin America to have a large racial and/or ethnic dimension.  Clearly other dimensions of
inequality need to be considered besides earnings inequality, and shortcomings of the available
data that we use need to be considered as well in terms of their ability to capture the full range of
economic outcomes that people experience.  Nevertheless, our results, based on large survey
data, relatively consistent across four countries, and utilizing a range of calculations in order to
provide some robustness check, sets up a challenge for those who would draw inferences based
on alternative data that may be actually less rather than more representative of the actual
situation in Latin America.  We hope that others will follow our path of considering how to18
develop quantitative measurements of the extent and nature of inequality along this and other
dimensions in order that both measurement and policy may proceed conditioned on ever-
increasing and more reliable information about how inequality operates within societies.   19
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Table 1:  Earnings inequality measures; overall and by gender-racial/ethnic group







Bolivia 0.60 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.69
Brazil 0.65 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.50
Guatemala 0.78 0.73 0.55 0.67 0.69
Guyana 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.41 0.26
Theil(0)
Bolivia 0.73 0.52 0.69 0.61 0.82
Brazil 0.58 0.56 0.45 0.53 0.44
Guatemala 0.86 0.72 0.65 0.85 0.85
Guyana 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.26
Gini
Bolivia 0.56 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.60
Brazil 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.49
Guatemala 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.61
Guyana 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.37
90th percentile /10th percentile wages
Bolivia 35.4 14.5 32.6 20.4 39.0
Brazil 10.4 13.7   8.8 10.0   9.0
Guatemala 36.8 23.2 26.2 43.2 42.8
Guyana   5.5   4.3   5.1   4.9   5.2
50th percentile /10th percentile wages
Bolivia   9.8   4.2 10.7   5.9   9.6
Brazil   2.6   3.4   2.5   2.5   2.8
Guatemala 10.3   6.3   7.5 12.8   8.0
Guyana   2.6   2.3   2.0   2.4   2.621







Decompositions of white men/women wage differentials
Bolivia 0.29 -0.07  (-24%) 0.36  (124%)
Brazil 0.41 -0.12  (-29%) 0.53  (129%)
Guatemala 0.92  0.14  (15%) 0.78    (85%)
Guyana 0.56  0.01    (2%) 0.55    (98%)
Decompositions of nonwhite men/women wage differentials
Bolivia 0.39 -0.05    (-13%) 0.44  (113%)
Brazil 0.38 -0.14    (-37%) 0.52  (137%)
Guatemala 0.80  0.23    (29%) 0.57    (71%)
Guyana 0.63 -0.07  (-111%) 0.70  (111%)
Decompositions of white/nonwhite men wage differentials
Bolivia 0.94  0.57    (61%) 0.37    (39%)
Brazil 0.62  0.47    (76%) 0.15    (24%)
Guatemala 0.72  0.44    (61%) 0.28    (39%)
Guyana 0.01 -0.04  (-400%) 0.05  (500%)
Decompositions of white/nonwhite women wage differentials
Bolivia 1.04  0.65    (63%) 0.39    (37%)
Brazil 0.58  0.46    (79%) 0.12    (21%)
Guatemala 0.60  0.45    (75%) 0.15    (25%)
Guyana 0.07 -0.13  (-186%) 0.20  (-286%)
Decompositions of white men/nonwhite women wage differentials
Bolivia 1.33  0.51  (38%) 0.82    (62%)
Brazil 1.00  0.31  (31%) 0.69    (69%)
Guatemala 1.52  0.65  (43%) 0.87    (57%)
Guyana 0.63 -0.11  (-17%) 0.74  (117%)22
Table 3:  Simulated v. actual number of children, Brazil
Simulated number of children in actual terms
0 1 2 3 4 >4 Total
0 2974068 62837 45063 8299 3915 549472 3643654
1 166252 2841511 20134 529 213 496346 3524985
2 156287 64255 2710228 0 1212 442859 3374841
3 105332 96573 80433 1504710 6945 275641 2069634
4 56890 55098 69251 15938 662625 136922 996724
>4 53675 71626 105656 32697 13047 660480 937181


























Simulated number of children in percentage terms
0 1 2 3 4 >4
0 0.8162 0.0172 0.0124 0.0023 0.0011 0.1508
1 0.0472 0.8061 0.0057 0.0002 0.0001 0.1408
2 0.0463 0.0190 0.8031 0.0000 0.0004 0.1312
3 0.0509 0.0467 0.0389 0.7270 0.0034 0.1332
4 0.0571 0.0553 0.0695 0.0160 0.6648 0.1374


























Table 4:  Inequality measures for earnings, based on actual and simulated earnings





























(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Theil(1)
Bolivia 0.60 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.55
Brazil 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.65
Guatemala 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.79
Guyana 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.33
Theil(0)
Bolivia 0.73 0.63 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.65
Brazil 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59
Guatemala 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.86
Guyana 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.30
Gini
Bolivia 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55
Brazil 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.57
Guatemala 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.63
Guyana 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40
90th percentile wages /10th percentile wages 
Bolivia 35.4 24.3 31.3 22.2 26.9 34.0 26.6
Brazil 10.4 11.8 12.2 12.1 14.2 15.5 16.7
Guatemala 36.8 32.5 27.2 23.9 30.3 28.3 21.4
Guyana 5.5 5.4 4.7 4.9 5.3 4.7 4.7
50th percentile wages /10th percentile wages 
Bolivia 9.8 7.5 9.7 7.1 7.6 9.9 7.7
Brazil 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.3 4.2
Guatemala 10.3 9.3 7.9 7.2 8.7 7.5 5.8
Guyana 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.324
Table 5:  Theil index of earnings inequality decompositions












Theil (1) 0.60 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.69 0.53 0.07 (12%)
Theil (0) 0.73 0.52 0.69 0.61 0.82 0.66 0.07 (10%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.03 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.59 0.52 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.56 0.03 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.55 0.47 0.63 0.44 0.62 0.54 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.65 0.52 0.74 0.55 0.74 0.64 0.01 (2%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.65 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.50 0.57 0.07 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.58 0.56 0.45 0.53 0.44 0.50 0.08 (14%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.03 (5%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.04 (7%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.02 (4%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.78 0.73 0.55 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.09 (12%)
Theil (0) 0.86 0.72 0.65 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.11 (13%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.71 0.73 0.51 0.63 0.44 0.67 0.04 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.66 0.63 0.67 0.05 (6%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.75 0.73 0.86 0.68 1.29 0.75 0.01 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.67 0.93 0.73 0.01 (1%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.41 0.26 0.31 0.02 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.26 0.28 0.02 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.41 0.34 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.33 0.32 0.39 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.22 0.37 0.29 0.00 (0%)25
Table 5 (continued)
 (ii) Decomposition of earnings inequality among men by race/ethnicity
Total White Men Nonwhite Men Within Between
Bolivia
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.05 (9%)
Theil (0) 0.67 0.52 0.69 0.62 0.05 (7%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.03 (5%)
Theil (0) 0.58 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.03 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.54 0.47 0.63 0.53 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.63 0.52 0.74 0.62 0.01 (2%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.63 0.60 0.51 0.57 0.06 (10%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.45 0.51 0.06 (11%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.04 (5%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.04 (7%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.02 (4%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.76 0.73 0.55 0.69 0.07 (9%)
Theil (0) 0.77 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.08 (10%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.79 0.74 0.55 0.70 0.09 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.86 0.82 0.67 0.76 0.10 (12%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.75 0.73 0.86 0.74 0.01 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.73 0.01 (1%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.34 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.00 (0%)26
Table 5 (continued)
 (iii) Decomposition of earnings inequality among women by race/ethnicity
Total White Women Nonwhite Women Within Between
Bolivia
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.68 0.56 0.69 0.61 0.07 (10%)
Theil (0) 0.80 0.61 0.82 0.73 0.07 (9%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.04 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.64 0.04 (6%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.62 0.56 0.72 0.61 0.00 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.69 0.61 0.82 0.68 0.01 (1%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.61 0.59 0.50 0.57 0.05 (7%)
Theil (0) 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.05 (10%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.57 0.03 (5%)
Theil (0) 0.54 0.53 0.46 0.50 0.04 (7%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.02 (4%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.76 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.08 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.95 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.10 (11%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.74 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.06 (8%)
Theil (0) 0.94 0.85 0.93 0.88 0.07 (6%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.69 0.67 0.84 0.69 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.87 0.85 1.05 0.86 0.01 (1%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.31 0.41 0.26 0.31 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.29 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.37 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.01 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.01 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.35 0.00 (0%)27
Table 5 (continued)
 (iv) Decomposition of earnings inequality among whites by gender
Total White Men White Women Within Between
Bolivia
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.51 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.55 0.01 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.50 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.00 (0%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.02 (4%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.62 0.60 0.66 0.62 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.00 (0%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.72 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.79 0.72 0.85 0.77 0.02 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.72 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.79 0.72 0.85 0.77 0.02 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.72 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.71 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.00 (0%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.34 0.01 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.30 0.27 0.34 0.28 0.01 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.34 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.00 (0%)28
Table 5 (continued)
 (v) Decomposition of earnings inequality among nonwhites by gender
Total Nonwhite Men Nonwhite Women Within Between
Bolivia
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.59 0.53 0.69 0.57 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.73 0.02 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.00 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.70 0.69 0.78 0.70 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.62 0.53 0.81 0.62 0.01 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.77 0.69 0.98 0.76 0.01 (1%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.01 (2%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.00 (0%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.61 0.55 0.69 0.58 0.03 (5%)
Theil (0) 0.75 0.65 0.85 0.71 0.04 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.57 0.55 0.74 0.57 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.67 0.65 0.83 0.67 0.00 (0%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.02 (7%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.02 (5%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.00 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.00 (0%)29
Table 5 (continued)
 (vi) Decomposition of earnings inequality among white men and nonwhite women
Total White Men Nonwhite Women Within Between
Bolivia
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.63 0.47 0.69 0.52 0.12 (18%)
Theil (0) 0.79 0.52 0.82 0.66 0.13 (16%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.02 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.52 0.64 0.55 0.03 (6%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.52 0.47 0.62 0.51 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.61 0.52 0.74 0.60 0.01 (2%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.67 0.60 0.50 0.59 0.08 (12%)
Theil (0) 0.63 0.56 0.44 0.52 0.11 (17%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.02 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.02 (4%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.62 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.01 (2%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.83 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.10 (12%)
Theil (0) 0.89 0.72 0.85 0.75 0.14 (16%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.74 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.01 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.74 0.72 0.63 0.72 0.02 (3%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.76 0.73 1.29 0.76 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.74 0.72 0.93 0.74 0.00 (0%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.02 (6%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.01 (4%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.43 0.28 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.28 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.00 (0%)30
Table 6:  Inequality measures for per capita household earnings, based on actual and





























(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Theil(1)
Bolivia 0.77 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.63 0.57
Brazil 0.72 0.65 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.66
Guatemala 0.87 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.76
Guyana 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32
Theil(0)
Bolivia 0.93 0.67 0.75 0.60 0.78 0.82 0.71
Brazil 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64
Guatemala 0.97 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84
Guyana 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.30
Gini
Bolivia 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.56
Brazil 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.58
Guatemala 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.61
Guyana 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.40
90th percentile wages /10th percentile wages 
Bolivia 62.0 29.0 43.6 23.6 44.6 49.4 37.6
Brazil 17.9 16.4 19.1 17.6 16.8 18.1 17.1
Guatemala 49.5 33.9 42.8 34.5 37.0 40.9 35.5
Guyana 6.9 5.3 5.2 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.2
50th percentile wages /10th percentile wages 
Bolivia 14.5 7.7 11.7 6.3 11.4 12.2 10.1
Brazil 4.0 3.8 4.2 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0
Guatemala 10.5 8.1 9.8 8.0 9.5 10.1 9.0
Guyana 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.331












Theil (1) 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.76 0.67 0.11 (14%)
Theil (0) 0.93 0.71 0.86 0.78 1.02 0.83 0.10 (11%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.67 0.40 0.50 0.07 (12%)
Theil (0) 0.71 0.60 0.67 0.78 0.46 0.65 0.07 (9%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.39 0.53 0.49 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.60 0.55 0.64 0.44 0.61 0.59 0.01 (2%)
Brazil
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.72 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.64 0.08 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.68 0.64 0.53 0.63 0.53 0.59 0.09 (13%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.72 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.62 0.66 0.06 (8%)
Theil (0) 0.69 0.65 0.58 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.07 (10%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.85 0.74 0.92 0.82 0.96 0.84 0.01 (1%)
Theil (0) 0.83 0.72 0.90 0.77 0.91 0.82 0.01 (1%)
Guatemala
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.87 0.83 0.62 0.55 0.75 0.77 0.10 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.97 0.91 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.12 (12%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.76 0.74 0.55 0.50 0.59 0.68 0.08 (11%)
Theil (0) 0.84 0.82 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.09 (11%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.79 0.74 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.77 0.02 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.86 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.83 0.03 (3%)
Guyana
Observed earnings
Theil (1) 0.37 0.33 0.42 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.01 (3%)
Theil (0) 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.01 (2%)
Simulated earnings — returns only
Theil (1) 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.23 0.34 0.32 0.00 (0%)
Theil (0) 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.00 (0%)
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics
Theil (1) 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.20 0.51 0.33 0.01 (2%)
Theil (0) 0.31 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.49 0.30 0.01 (3%)32
Table A-1:  OLS log earnings regressions
(i) Bolivia
Variable label White Men Indigenous   Men White Women
Indigenous
Women
         
Primary 0.40* 0.39** 0.57* 0.56**
  (0.20)  (0.12) (0.22) (0.16)
Secondary 0.66** 0.65** 0.97** 0.78**
   (0.20) (0.13) (0.24) (0.18)
Tertiary 1.00** 0.92** 1.21** 1.17**
  (0.21) (0.14) (0.25) (0.18)
Age 0.10** 0.05** 0.08** 0.07**
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal sector wage employee 0.61** 0.73** 0.66** 0.62**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.19)
Informal sector wage employee 0.50** 0.75** 0.23 0.25*
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12)
Public sector employee 0.29* 0.71** 0.42** 0.97**
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Urban 1.04** 1.22** 1.19** 1.08**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.19) (0.12)
Constant 2.83** 3.32** 2.58** 2.42**
(0.29) (0.25) (0.43) (0.40)
Number of Observations 923 1510 586 753
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.51 0.38 0.39
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level33
Table A-1 (continued)
(ii) Brazil
Variable label White Men Afro- Men White Women Afro- Women
         
1 year of schooling 0.10** 0.00 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
2 years of schooling 0.05* 0.04 -0.03 0.08
(0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04)
3 years of schooling 0.10** 0.05 -0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
4 years of schooling 0.20** 0.08** 0.07 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
5 years of schooling 0.18** 0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
6 years of schooling 0.20** 0.08* 0.11 0.13**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
7 years of schooling 0.20** 0.06 0.10 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
8 years of schooling 0.27** 0.07 0.17** 0.14*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
9 years of schooling 0.25** 0.05 0.18** 0.13*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
10 years of schooling 0.22** 0.06 0.20** 0.16*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
11 years of schooling 0.42** 0.17** 0.39** 0.28**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
12 years of schooling 0.52** 0.39** 0.61** 0.47**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
13 years of schooling 0.53** 0.30** 0.59** 0.57**
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
14 years of schooling 0.53** 0.34** 0.72** 0.66**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
15 years of schooling 0.75** 0.45** 0.82** 0.78**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
16 years of schooling 0.78** 0.62** 1.02** 0.86**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
17 years of schooling 0.97** 0.64** 1.11** 1.07**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.08** 0.06** 0.09** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother’s years of schooling^2 -0.005** -0.003* -0.006** -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002)
Age 0.08** 0.06** 0.05** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.0004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age*Schooling 0.001** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
With labor card 0.04** 0.11** 0.19** 0.32**34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Without labor card -0.30** -0.20** -0.20** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Public sector -0.05** 0.14** 0.07** 0.28**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Employer 0.62** 0.77** 0.91** 1.14**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
North -0.17** -0.10** -0.13** -0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Northeast -0.44** -0.39** -0.52** -0.48**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
South -0.13** -0.11** -0.12** -0.07**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Center-West -0.07** 0.02 -0.12** -0.04*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban 0.34** 0.29** 0.33** 0.36**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 3.68** 3.85** 3.69** 3.66**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Number of Observations 32,417 26,507 19,750 14,251
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level35
Table A-1 (continued)
(iii) Guatemala
Variable label White Men Indigenous     Men White Women Indigenous Women
         
Primary 0.40** 0.26** 0.31 0.22
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.13)
Secondary 0.53** 0.58** 0.39 0.45
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.23)
Tertiary 1.58** 0.96** 0.39 1.62*
  (0.26) (0.20) (0.46) (0.82)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.06** 0.05 0.02 0.05
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.04** 0.04** 0.08** 0.05**
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal sector wage employee 1.23** 1.66** 1.93** 1.86**
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15)
Informal sector wage employee 0.98** 1.07** 1.18** 0.76**
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10)
Public employee 1.36** 1.97** 2.24** 1.41**
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41)
Guatemala City -0.19* -0.08 0.43* 0.28
  (0.10) (0.33) (0.17) (0.20)
Rural -0.45** -0.36** -0.29 -0.54**
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.12)
Constant 4.82** 4.60** 3.40** 4.18**
(0.21) (0.30) (0.65) (0.40)
Number of Observations 2795 1990 1363 906
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.21
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level36
Table A-1 (continued)
(iv) Guyana
Variable label Indo- Men Afro- Men Indo- Women Afro- Women
         
Primary 0.05 0.21 0.41** 0.12
(0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)
Secondary 0.21* 0.34* 0.71** 0.34
(0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24)
Tertiary 0.54** 0.68** 1.30** 0.71**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.25)
Age 0.09** 0.06** 0.04* 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Employee -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.31**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Georgetown 0.03 -0.03 0.53** 0.53**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.19) (0.10)
Rural -0.07 -0.22** 0.26 0.31**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10)
Constant 8.34** 8.68** 7.89** 8.16**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.45) (0.35)
Number of Observations 866 720 279 481
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-2:  Simulated v. actual years of schooling and employment sector, Brazil
(i) Simulated v. actual years of schooling
Nonwhite men
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 6316 133 171 234 684 75 99 54 205 46 50 274 12 10 13 64 30 3743 12213
1 5 1155 3 16 59 14 17 14 44 11 17 58 4 3 4 18 7 378 1827
2 8 8 1823 28 135 46 38 32 74 26 35 138 6 2 10 28 15 676 3128
3 1 3 1 2401 94 33 30 33 94 44 37 138 9 9 7 44 21 894 3893
4 2 2 0 5 4902 31 35 41 115 64 58 213 17 18 18 71 54 1548 7194
5 0 0 0 1 23 1990 12 28 70 45 51 139 14 16 18 31 17 707 3162
6 0 0 0 2 12 3 1452 5 37 23 29 115 10 11 5 24 15 442 2185
7 0 1 0 3 25 3 4 1498 46 25 34 125 4 12 12 37 18 512 2359
8 0 0 0 1 30 0 0 0 2960 12 20 111 16 16 22 60 32 1009 4289
9 0 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 9 794 6 33 8 5 9 18 12 199 1101
10 0 1 0 0 11 0 1 0 12 1 823 37 5 4 11 18 10 228 1162
11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 3201 10 12 20 51 43 890 4233
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 124 1 2 3 1 22 154
13 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 155 1 5 1 27 192
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 149 1 0 32 182
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 421 6 63 497
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 238 40 280
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 103 106
Total 6332 1303 1999 2692 5982 2195 1690 1705 3667 1091 1165 4584 240 275 309 894 521 11513 48157
Simulated years of schoolingWhite Women
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 4575 97 41 110 267 19 17 26 71 0 9 52 2 3 1 19 28 3737 9074
1 0 805 0 5 14 2 2 4 9 0 0 5 0 1 1 5 8 282 1143
2 31 21 1791 16 54 3 8 5 18 1 5 21 1 0 1 8 10 549 2543
3 48 27 10 2871 45 4 4 9 24 1 2 26 3 3 2 12 22 1004 4117
4 98 67 28 20 7898 43 32 24 72 4 27 44 7 7 1 44 96 2494 11006
5 41 14 6 11 8 2060 2 6 6 1 3 4 0 1 0 5 9 611 2788
6 21 11 2 5 6 6 1648 1 7 1 2 4 0 1 0 1 5 514 2235
7 36 21 9 16 12 17 8 1801 5 5 5 2 0 0 0 1 5 496 2439
8 33 32 15 24 24 33 28 21 4539 4 4 16 4 4 1 10 49 1274 6115
9 17 12 10 6 19 37 12 17 23 1124 5 5 1 1 0 2 9 267 1567
10 18 10 10 8 16 37 49 38 37 19 1513 0 3 2 2 0 8 326 2096
11 86 47 40 60 117 122 112 124 214 60 76 7146 12 23 21 59 188 1715 10222
12 5 0 3 2 5 9 13 9 14 9 11 6 452 2 5 0 4 93 642
13 4 2 3 4 3 5 15 5 14 2 6 2 0 590 0 1 3 99 758
14 4 3 3 6 21 17 10 10 40 5 8 27 5 6 629 6 21 113 934
15 24 7 6 17 50 27 21 36 95 13 37 117 15 32 13 2096 80 409 3095
16 2 0 0 1 2 6 2 3 10 2 3 0 2 2 2 0 918 138 1093
17 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 388 403
Total 5045 1176 1977 3183 8562 2450 1983 2139 5200 1252 1716 7477 508 678 680 2269 1466 14509 62270
Simulated years of schoolingNonwhite Women
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 6023 161 164 240 811 32 48 35 180 13 25 188 11 9 18 63 38 4236 12295
1 0 1028 1 4 47 1 5 4 14 0 2 26 2 2 1 4 12 365 1518
2 30 11 1795 22 126 19 16 13 57 11 16 63 5 3 8 21 17 684 2917
3 56 30 17 2429 97 19 20 25 60 12 16 79 5 6 11 32 27 958 3899
4 84 15 8 11 5020 41 24 13 52 16 24 101 17 11 10 66 51 1706 7270
5 33 16 2 6 29 1974 8 3 29 4 4 37 5 5 11 16 19 815 3016
6 23 10 2 2 4 14 1400 4 25 11 8 30 7 5 3 15 20 515 2098
7 23 11 5 3 8 6 3 1562 23 7 12 26 9 9 1 11 11 617 2347
8 19 7 1 0 3 2 0 0 3031 3 10 40 9 16 7 28 34 947 4157
9 11 4 1 1 9 0 1 6 17 890 8 23 5 8 5 13 10 262 1274
10 10 4 0 1 1 18 5 6 21 8 988 23 9 3 8 8 15 302 1430
11 54 22 4 8 31 17 20 15 59 6 14 3967 20 37 24 65 72 1187 5622
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 141 4 1 1 3 21 172
13 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 1 1 0 39 184
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 214 3 3 33 255
15 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 2 581 20 89 706
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 178 32 210
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 73 74
Total 6371 1320 2000 2729 6188 2143 1550 1687 3570 981 1127 4603 245 265 325 929 530 12881 49444
Simulated years of schoolingTable A-2 (continued)
(i) Simulated v. actual employment sector
Nonwhite men
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.8627 0.0329 0.0378 0.0486 0.0035 0.0144
0.0055 0.9294 0.0224 0.0285 0.0018 0.0124
0.0063 0.0187 0.9441 0.0172 0.0004 0.0133
0.0123 0.0276 0.0235 0.9258 0.0020 0.0088
0.0172 0.0521 0.0736 0.0601 0.7709 0.0261
0.0020 0.0201 0.0322 0.0402 0.0040 0.9015
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
10631 406 466 599 43 178 12323
56 9457 228 290 18 126 10175
74 220 11086 202 5 156 11743
115 257 219 8632 19 82 9324
37 112 158 129 1656 56 2148
2 20 32 40 4 897 995
Total 10915 10472 12189 9892 1745 1495 46708
White Women
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.4309 0.1602 0.2428 0.1284 0.0138 0.0239
0.0000 0.9212 0.0625 0.0114 0.0000 0.0049
0.0057 0.0253 0.9463 0.0080 0.0048 0.0099
0.0010 0.0354 0.0720 0.8774 0.0033 0.0108
0.0114 0.0925 0.1968 0.0631 0.5989 0.0373
0.0000 0.0279 0.1611 0.0440 0.0043 0.7626
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
15697 5834 8845 4677 503 871 36427
0 4523 307 56 0 24 4910
53 234 8757 74 44 92 9254
6 203 413 5031 19 62 5734
38 308 655 210 1993 124 3328
0 26 150 41 4 710 931
Total 15794 11128 19127 10089 2563 1883 60584
Nonwhite women
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.4323 0.1732 0.2097 0.1511 0.0111 0.0226
0.0000 0.9397 0.0435 0.0085 0.0000 0.0083
0.0044 0.0375 0.9365 0.0044 0.0024 0.0147
0.0020 0.0518 0.0919 0.8385 0.0031 0.0127
0.0235 0.1278 0.1691 0.0682 0.5644 0.0471
0.0000 0.0130 0.0433 0.0173 0.0000 0.9264
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
12740 5105 6179 4454 326 667 29471
0 3756 174 34 0 33 3997
26 219 5472 26 14 86 5843
13 335 594 5419 20 82 6463
49 266 352 142 1175 98 2082
0 3 10 4 0 214 231






Simulated occupationTable A-3:  Multinomial logits for education, number of children, and sector
(i) Bolivia
Educational Multinomial
White Men (N=616) Nonwhite Men (N=1000) White Women (N=645) Nonwhite Women (N=1114)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age 0.108 0.013 0.076 -0.021 -0.135* -0.020 -0.202* -0.336** -0.232* -0.050 -0.282** -0.067
(0.079) (0.082) (0.084) (0.049) (0.058) (0.068) (0.087) (0.089) (0.106) (0.038) (0.043) (0.057)
Age^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.000 0.002** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Chuquisaca -17.331** -16.400** -16.917** -17.537** -17.961** 1.204 0.072 -1.404 -0.876 -16.724** 2.570** 3.469**
(1.703) (1.972) (1.576) (1.810) (1.306) (1.495) (1.282) (2.030) (1.671) (0.888) (0.934) (0.873)
La Paz -17.209** -15.382** -16.897 -16.539** -16.385** 2.261 0.622 -0.784 -0.702 -14.883** 4.675** 4.073**
(0.758) (1.181) (.) (1.816) (1.284) (1.574) (1.273) (1.997) (1.654) (0.831) (0.853) (0.854)
Cochabamba -18.828** -17.069** -18.375** -16.093** -16.815** 2.509 1.499 0.307 -0.013 -14.955** 3.908** 4.319**
(1.599) (1.838) (1.438) (1.836) (1.320) (1.577) (1.205) (1.967) (1.649) (0.906) (0.924) (0.895)
Oruro -18.917** -16.551** -17.629** -16.681** -16.449** 2.639 0.370 -1.186 -0.390 -15.522** 4.644** 4.822**
(1.588) (1.840) (1.406) (1.905) (1.417) (1.558) (1.269) (1.998) (1.653) (0.895) (0.906) (0.923)
Potosi -0.489 1.531 0.116 -16.698** -17.180** 1.996 0.042 -1.251 -0.375 -15.828** 3.844** 3.435**
(1.014) (.) (1.192) (1.820) (1.291) (1.553) (1.252) (1.979) (1.624) (0.862) (0.868) (0.845)
Tarija -21.194** -18.793** -20.700** -18.553** -19.785 -0.082 0.904 -0.976 -0.639 -15.679** 3.780 4.274**
(1.451) (1.713) (1.247) (1.526) (.) (1.826) (1.330) (2.114) (1.725) (0.967) (.) (1.036)
Santa Cruz -19.344** -17.859** -20.003** -17.506** -17.652** 1.787 1.031 -0.351 -0.583 -15.590** 4.906** 4.112**
(1.394) (1.672) (1.218) (1.840) (1.328) (1.632) (1.230) (1.973) (1.621) (0.903) (0.941) (0.983)
Beni -20.117** -18.070** -20.497** -16.629** -16.943** 2.199 1.922 0.916 0.414 -15.504** 5.486** 4.550
(1.472) (1.741) (1.344) (1.890) (1.393) (1.578) (1.348) (2.046) (1.737) (0.979) (0.983) (.)
Urban 0.920 2.138** 3.195** 1.282** 2.758** 2.813** 2.141** 4.026** 4.240** 1.333** 2.225** 2.712**
(0.591) (0.613) (0.695) (0.313) (0.358) (0.411) (0.502) (0.574) (0.708) (0.210) (0.290) (0.420)
Constant 19.870** 19.669** 18.644** 19.950** 21.399** -0.569 6.464* 9.030** 6.448* 18.261 1.201 -3.335*
(2.020) (2.241) (1.981) (2.142) (1.783) (.) (2.614) (3.023) (2.982) (.) (1.242) (1.449)
Demographic Multinomial
White Women (N=976) Nonwhite Women (N=1686)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.056 0.028 0.003 0.516** 0.722** -0.026 -0.016 0.184* 0.403** 0.778**
(0.054) (0.080) (0.116) (0.189) (0.271) (0.047) (0.056) (0.084) (0.141) (0.216)
Age^2 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009** -0.012** -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.007** -0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Primary 0.469 0.055 -0.082 -0.173 -0.980 0.040 0.251 -0.298 0.099 0.093
(0.420) (0.465) (0.436) (0.951) (0.665) (0.238) (0.256) (0.265) (0.303) (0.361)
Secondary 0.463 -0.436 -0.940 -0.868 -2.266** -0.309 -0.334 -1.079** -1.210* -1.684*
(0.480) (0.515) (0.518) (1.090) (0.832) (0.376) (0.379) (0.406) (0.490) (0.742)
University -0.066 -0.818 -1.379* -3.683** -34.006** -0.227 -0.309 -1.700** -2.095** -2.351*
(0.484) (0.516) (0.561) (1.273) (0.724) (0.347) (0.375) (0.453) (0.591) (1.081)
Urban 0.134 -0.201 -0.529 -1.010 -1.213* 0.083 -0.430* -0.380 -0.806** -1.570**
(0.346) (0.344) (0.366) (0.605) (0.522) (0.204) (0.209) (0.223) (0.263) (0.330)
Constant 1.748 1.830 2.274 -6.605 -8.639 1.895 2.422* -0.705 -4.796 -11.309**
(1.282) (1.646) (2.257) (3.141)* (4.688) (1.156) (1.215) (1.632) (2.490) (3.770)Occupational Multinomial
White Men (N=1363) Nonwhite Men (N=2016) White Women (N=1507) Nonwhite Women (N=2107)
Variable Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner
Primary 1.750 18.239** 0.596 1.054 0.499 18.637** 0.309 1.279 -15.663** 3.957 -16.528** -16.378** 3.721** 2.881 3.255* 3.010*
(1.298) (2.228) (1.264) (1.316) (0.836) (1.825) (0.800) (0.919) (2.576) (.) (2.419) (2.431) (1.573) (1.742) (1.535) (1.535)
Secondary 1.042 19.199** -0.019 0.596 -0.931 18.485** -0.863 -0.056 -17.541** 3.856** -19.207** -18.529** 0.924 2.735* -0.296 -0.263
(1.272) (2.217) (1.239) (1.289) (0.851) (1.788) (0.816) (0.961) (2.707) (1.124) (2.509) (2.533) (1.214) (1.386) (1.142) (1.133)
University 0.129 19.705** -0.826 0.242 -1.293 19.067** -2.293** -0.042 -17.327** 4.620** -20.439** -19.340** 0.451 2.649 -2.067 -1.726
(1.261) (2.158) (1.222) (1.268) (0.884) (1.725) (0.858) (1.003) (2.569) (1.140) (2.393) (2.412) (1.209) (1.467) (1.150) (1.131)
Age -0.150 0.215* -0.152 -0.443** -0.132 0.054 -0.091 -0.346** -0.253 0.253 -0.240* -0.484** -0.288 -0.188 -0.296 -0.513*
(0.084) (0.105) (0.084) (0.083) (0.074) (0.093) (0.072) (0.073) (0.143) (0.162) (0.120) (0.116) (0.208) (0.213) (0.203) (0.201)
Age^2 0.002 -0.002 0.002* 0.006** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003 -0.003 0.003* 0.006** 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Average age of hh 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.025 0.051* 0.052* 0.063** 0.068** -0.018 0.024 0.002 0.015 0.048 0.023 0.027 0.033
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.044) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042)
average # in hh w/no ed 1.863 3.808 2.552 -0.036 -2.342 -3.834* -3.146* -3.770* -0.559 -1.825 -2.313 -1.980 98.559 98.501** 100.359** 101.487**
(1.879) (2.029) (1.914) (2.017) (1.484) (1.658) (1.470) (1.512) (1.841) (1.875) (1.506) (1.436) (.) (2.005) (1.243) (1.242)
average # in hh w/pr ed 0.226 0.108 0.673 -1.441 -1.662 -2.671* -2.691* -3.075* 1.423 -1.243 0.044 0.494 19.613 21.189** 21.328 22.156
(0.978) (1.108) (1.066) (1.103) (1.279) (1.328) (1.306) (1.314) (1.658) (1.727) (1.459) (1.455) (.) (8.105) (14.299) (.)
average # in hh w/sec ed -0.576 0.005 0.119 -1.189 -2.157 -2.907* -2.770* -3.189* 0.669 -0.024 0.149 0.623 18.008 20.065 19.894 20.393**
(0.848) (1.011) (0.942) (0.948) (1.209) (1.245) (1.215) (1.250) (1.499) (1.571) (1.323) (1.334) (.) (.) (.) (4.727)
average # in hh w/ter ed -1.288 -0.948 -0.788 -1.491 -2.337* -2.453* -2.888* -2.744* -0.187 -0.653 -0.799 -0.105 16.500 20.059 19.405 20.093
(0.939) (1.022) (1.024) (1.093) (1.191) (1.236) (1.228) (1.231) (1.467) (1.496) (1.245) (1.243) (.) (.) (.) (11.584)
Number of children in hh -0.076 -0.187 -0.035 -0.277* -0.068 0.019 -0.050 -0.130 0.146 0.116 0.099 0.122 0.214 -0.212 0.117 0.113
(0.115) (0.154) (0.119) (0.124) (0.110) (0.132) (0.106) (0.119) (0.173) (0.190) (0.158) (0.151) (0.202) (0.231) (0.194) (0.191)
Number of teens in hh -0.024 -0.078 -0.255 0.013 0.231 0.291 0.170 0.381* 0.205 0.360 0.085 0.191 -0.424 -0.188 -0.470 -0.292
(0.171) (0.218) (0.172) (0.179) (0.174) (0.193) (0.168) (0.179) (0.243) (0.278) (0.230) (0.208) (0.264) (0.263) (0.240) (0.234)
Number of adults in hh 0.041 0.018 -0.062 0.163 0.117 0.078 0.094 0.086 -0.091 0.045 0.139 0.159 0.248 0.295 0.104 0.240
(0.160) (0.179) (0.158) (0.162) (0.178) (0.209) (0.172) (0.185) (0.190) (0.189) (0.177) (0.165) (0.505) (0.520) (0.498) (0.495)
Number of elderly in hh -0.683 -0.870 -0.590 -0.893 -0.496 -0.250 0.201 0.054 0.337 -0.753 -0.089 -0.160 -2.777** -1.765 -2.052* -2.302*
(0.453) (0.473) (0.450) (0.462) (0.492) (0.582) (0.447) (0.471) (0.549) (0.614) (0.533) (0.513) (1.012) (0.954) (0.944) (0.940)
Household head -0.553 -1.023 0.009 -1.706** -0.739 -0.323 0.697 -2.440** -0.013 1.451 1.799 0.636 19.837 22.398** 21.747* 19.927
(0.563) (0.602) (0.580) (0.591) (0.678) (0.808) (0.684) (0.676) (1.111) (0.981) (0.979) (0.926) (.) (7.786) (9.447) (.)
Spouse -1.147 -2.600 -0.055 -1.942 -1.845 -5.345** -1.753 -3.481* -0.356 0.593 1.255* 1.070* -0.137 1.474 1.100 0.857
(1.227) (1.566) (1.399) (1.889) (1.256) (1.479) (1.174) (1.438) (0.642) (0.649) (0.570) (0.530) (0.902) (1.199) (0.876) (0.843)
Urban -0.614 -0.871 -1.847* -1.340 -0.723 -1.725** -2.387** -1.468* 0.089 -2.075 -0.587 -1.187 -18.104 -20.297 -18.634** -19.252**
(0.823) (0.980) (0.813) (0.820) (0.572) (0.629) (0.549) (0.586) (1.205) (1.276) (1.134) (1.118) (12.971) (.) (2.981) (2.982)
Constant 4.511* -23.219 4.919* 10.526** 6.487** -17.021 6.250** 10.913** 22.584** -8.701** 24.194 28.897** 3.812 0.041 4.856* 9.593**
(2.012) (.) (2.002) (2.032) (1.607) (.) (1.606) (1.649) (2.316) (3.231) (.) (0.878) (2.232) (0.000) (2.088) (2.022)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-3 (continued)
(ii) Brazil
Educational Multinomial
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Men Men Women Women
Variable (N=43,303) (N=36,820) (N=48,285) (N=36,736)
Age
Age^2 See Table A-2 (i);
Mother's years of schooling full results
Mother's years of schooling^2 for all
North 18 categories






White Women (N=38,989) Nonwhite Women (N=28,443)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age 0.077** 0.301** 0.422** 0.491** 0.623** 0.048** 0.164** 0.254** 0.380** 0.551**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.026) (0.040) (0.059) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.031)
Age^2 -0.002** -0.004** -0.006** -0.007** -0.008** -0.001** -0.002** -0.004** -0.005** -0.007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling -0.034** -0.048** -0.097** -0.192** -0.278** -0.015** -0.026** -0.065** -0.142** -0.222**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Mother's years of schooling -0.056** -0.054** -0.078** -0.188** -0.241** -0.044** -0.073** -0.111** -0.124** -0.253**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.055) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.034) (0.046)
North 0.544** 0.846** 1.056** 1.624** 1.703** 0.188** 0.469** 0.825** 1.054** 1.792**
(0.103) (0.108) (0.126) (0.169) (0.221) (0.075) (0.076) (0.084) (0.107) (0.108)
Northeast 0.329** 0.501** 0.745** 1.196** 1.541** 0.092* 0.272** 0.429** 0.607** 0.932**
(0.049) (0.052) (0.064) (0.092) (0.113) (0.045) (0.047) (0.055) (0.073) (0.081)
South 0.083* 0.036 -0.014 0.019 -0.135 -0.098 -0.005 0.049 0.045 -0.213
(0.035) (0.038) (0.051) (0.088) (0.124) (0.084) (0.086) (0.102) (0.138) (0.176)
Center-West 0.065 0.256** 0.394** 0.235* 0.100 -0.071 0.105 0.105 0.026 -0.269*
(0.052) (0.053) (0.067) (0.120) (0.172) (0.061) (0.061) (0.072) (0.100) (0.126)
Urban -0.020 -0.094 -0.191** -0.351** -0.696** -0.013 -0.066 -0.243** -0.409** -0.636**
(0.048) (0.050) (0.061) (0.086) (0.099) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059) (0.072) (0.073)
Constant -0.199 -4.051** -6.641** -8.420** -11.210** -0.087 -1.979** -3.801** -6.637** -9.861**
(0.178) (0.273) (0.464) (0.719) (1.079) (0.189) (0.225) (0.310) (0.420) (0.574)Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level
Occupational Multinomial
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Men Men Women Women
Variable (N=52,927) (N=46,683) (N=60,562) (N=48,053)
Years of schooling
Years of schooling^2 See Table A-2 (ii);
Age full results
Age^2 for all
Age*years of schooling 5 categories
Average age of hh by race-gender group
Average schooling of hh available 
Number of children in hh upon 
Number of adults in hh request












White Men (N=3381) Nonwhite Men (N=2374) White Women (N=4205) Nonwhite Women (N=3035)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age -0.042 -0.124** 0.135 -0.047* 0.054 0.299 -0.067** -0.074* 0.315** -0.082** -0.183** 0.048
(0.022) (0.035) (0.075) (0.022) (0.081) (0.208) (0.016) (0.030) (0.121) (0.020) (0.059) (0.089)
Age^2 -0.000 0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002 -0.005* 0.000 -0.000 -0.005** 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother's years of schooling 0.345** 0.546** 0.764** 0.641** 0.823** 0.955** 0.314** 0.581** 0.793** 0.385** 0.578** 0.678**
(0.047) (0.051) (0.060) (0.139) (0.154) (0.181) (0.045) (0.053) (0.060) (0.096) (0.110) (0.134)
Guatemala City 0.200 -0.099 -0.715 0.288 -0.080 1.328 -0.376* -0.660* -1.061 0.188 -0.649 -40.915**
(0.234) (0.304) (0.624) (0.566) (0.815) (1.273) (0.175) (0.274) (0.655) (0.603) (1.163) (0.777)
Rural -0.657** -2.136** -3.411** -0.879** -2.302** -4.618** -1.017** -2.650** -2.604** -0.826** -3.478** -3.090*
(0.162) (0.214) (0.446) (0.178) (0.364) (1.118) (0.114) (0.208) (0.427) (0.141) (0.411) (1.253)
Constant 2.914** 4.161** -3.461* 2.528** -0.051 -6.952 2.943** 2.169** -7.956** 2.190** 2.735* -4.141
(0.532) (0.736) (1.622) (0.504) (1.326) (4.566) (0.371) (0.610) (2.221) (0.418) (1.076) (2.175)
Demographic Multinomial
White Women (N=3519) Nonwhite Women (N=2436)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.151** -0.163** -0.138** -0.033 0.220* -0.066 -0.106* 0.005 0.412** 0.474**
(0.031) (0.034) (0.040) (0.062) (0.105) (0.046) (0.053) (0.067) (0.101) (0.107)
Age^2 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.005** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.007** -0.008**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary -0.140 -0.192 -0.477* -0.458* -0.658** 0.218 -0.086 -0.143 -0.586* -0.764**
(0.183) (0.185) (0.186) (0.211) (0.220) (0.246) (0.255) (0.255) (0.253) (0.247)
Secondary -0.437 -0.641* -0.767* -0.968 -0.869 0.138 -0.977 -1.207 -1.967* -1.580*
(0.285) (0.306) (0.309) (0.735) (0.831) (0.569) (0.693) (0.669) (0.813) (0.786)
University 0.109 -0.058 -1.398 -1.572 -0.850 1.367 0.953 -44.689 -44.715 -44.342
(0.576) (0.687) (0.775) (1.150) (0.948) (1.100) (1.029) (.) (.) (.)
Mother's years of schooling -0.012 -0.028 -0.052 -0.190** -0.205* -0.067 -0.083 -0.165 -0.117 -0.199
(0.029) (0.035) (0.037) (0.073) (0.086) (0.074) (0.077) (0.106) (0.089) (0.129)
Guatemala City -0.061 0.137 -0.093 0.254 0.095 0.702 0.599 1.145 1.418 0.980
(0.254) (0.268) (0.313) (0.381) (0.457) (0.938) (0.955) (0.898) (1.013) (1.060)
Rural -0.004 0.292 0.610** 0.791** 1.023** 0.719** 0.873** 0.745** 1.034** 1.278**
(0.184) (0.179) (0.192) (0.239) (0.328) (0.234) (0.238) (0.268) (0.266) (0.246)
Constant 5.058** 5.600** 5.361** 2.904* -1.532 2.156 3.702** 2.156 -4.938** -6.363**
(0.794) (0.813) (0.913) (1.202) (2.046) (1.130) (1.245) (1.447) (1.880) (2.000)Occupational Multinomial
White Men (N=4790) Nonwhite Men (N=3341) White Women (N=5471) Nonwhite Women (N=3781)
Variable Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner
Primary -0.403* 1.167** -0.237 -0.376 -0.394 0.015 -0.292 -0.488* -1.342** -0.296 -1.407** -1.328** -1.070 -0.170 -0.506 -1.052
(0.183) (0.378) (0.184) (0.204) (0.218) (0.510) (0.220) (0.236) (0.324) (0.763) (0.307) (0.295) (0.655) (0.876) (0.642) (0.612)
Secondary -0.743** 1.344** -0.293 -0.013 -0.991* 1.274 -1.184* -0.479 -2.265** 0.599 -1.791** -1.597** -0.717 1.518 -0.092 -0.634
(0.246) (0.495) (0.248) (0.248) (0.490) (0.789) (0.534) (0.470) (0.408) (0.786) (0.393) (0.365) (1.080) (1.606) (1.057) (1.004)
University -1.734** 1.547** -0.943* -0.754* -2.725* 3.256** -1.576* -1.476* -2.434** 1.467 -1.916** -2.288** 509.228 -552.763 916.862 474.418
(0.379) (0.582) (0.384) (0.363) (1.061) (0.919) (0.768) (0.650) (0.504) (0.803) (0.553) (0.469) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Age -0.090** 0.009 0.042 -0.173** -0.114* -0.017 -0.032 -0.222** -0.106 0.054 -0.103 -0.290** -0.112 0.224 -0.060 -0.181*
(0.031) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.086) (0.049) (0.047) (0.057) (0.097) (0.057) (0.053) (0.091) (0.175) (0.090) (0.087)
Age^2 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.002* 0.000 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Average age of hh 0.029** 0.022* 0.032** 0.047** 0.008 -0.003 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.024* 0.062 -0.083 0.045 0.054
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.086) (0.035) (0.035)
average # in hh w/no ed -0.728* -0.934 -0.729* -0.984** -0.020 20.151** 0.176 -0.279 -1.077 -1.635 -1.222* -0.845 -0.724 2.160 -0.366 -0.260
(0.369) (0.531) (0.369) (0.381) (0.706) (1.902) (0.704) (0.749) (0.562) (1.010) (0.512) (0.480) (0.787) (1.177) (0.739) (0.687)
average # in hh w/pr ed -0.770* -0.647 -0.664 -1.215** -0.187 19.875** -0.070 -0.693 -0.677 -0.224 -0.767 -0.434 0.038 4.112** 0.266 0.085
(0.344) (0.427) (0.350) (0.345) (0.714) (1.881) (0.718) (0.751) (0.458) (0.758) (0.418) (0.401) (0.900) (1.556) (0.863) (0.829)
average # in hh w/sec ed -1.077** -0.689 -0.895* -1.533** -0.392 20.655** -0.321 -0.690 -0.689 -1.156 -1.072* -0.831 0.355 3.507* 0.752 0.234
(0.368) (0.421) (0.383) (0.367) (0.717) (1.930) (0.724) (0.790) (0.471) (0.788) (0.446) (0.431) (1.328) (1.748) (1.296) (1.289)
average # in hh w/ter ed -1.971** -1.151 -0.013 -0.875 -1.308 19.621** 0.127 0.303 -0.020 -0.616 -0.413 -0.054 33.550 -105.202 -65.199 -33.196
(0.609) (0.654) (0.567) (0.490) (1.456) (2.229) (1.295) (1.117) (0.679) (0.812) (0.675) (0.602) (20667255) (809517922)(49197247) (14706146)
Number of children in hh 0.106* -0.142* 0.009 -0.037 0.080 0.140 0.078 0.100* 0.023 -0.135 0.081 0.098 0.188 -0.716 0.231 0.265
(0.044) (0.064) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.091) (0.048) (0.049) (0.081) (0.124) (0.079) (0.075) (0.234) (0.590) (0.230) (0.221)
Number of teens in hh 0.196** -0.105 0.053 0.232** -0.216* -0.089 -0.205* 0.002 -0.032 0.140 0.028 -0.024 -0.128 -1.065 -0.090 -0.054
(0.063) (0.096) (0.067) (0.067) (0.086) (0.160) (0.087) (0.090) (0.107) (0.170) (0.106) (0.093) (0.224) (0.702) (0.220) (0.211)
Number of adults in hh 0.009 0.064 -0.048 0.002 0.032 0.265 0.077 0.122 0.001 -0.072 -0.068 -0.011 0.213 4.114 0.423 0.400
(0.056) (0.081) (0.062) (0.058) (0.095) (0.173) (0.106) (0.096) (0.087) (0.172) (0.086) (0.080) (0.815) (2.274) (0.812) (0.717)
Number of elderly in hh -0.137 -0.075 -0.252 -0.468** -0.126 0.512 0.115 -0.159 -0.175 -0.063 -0.116 -0.147 -0.560 0.807 -0.326 -0.291
(0.174) (0.309) (0.184) (0.181) (0.288) (0.444) (0.301) (0.296) (0.274) (0.440) (0.273) (0.246) (0.851) (1.081) (0.855) (0.814)
Household head 0.106 0.457 0.817** -1.157** -0.416 1.226 0.494 -1.522** -0.957 -0.415 0.415 -0.363 1.133 0.767 2.131 0.980
(0.263) (0.469) (0.291) (0.272) (0.365) (0.861) (0.427) (0.377) (0.529) (0.620) (0.490) (0.483) (1.932) (2.129) (1.909) (1.861)
Spouse 0.583 0.950 0.826 -0.254 20.126** 23.868 21.819** 19.548** -0.129 -0.054 1.577** 1.497** 0.224 0.348 1.713 1.593
(0.768) (1.043) (0.786) (1.013) (1.040) (.) (0.995) (1.081) (0.313) (0.464) (0.329) (0.285) (0.893) (1.032) (0.907) (0.858)
Guatemala City 1.630** 2.073** 1.561** 1.510** 1.553 -31.779** 2.138* 1.261 0.373 0.424 0.823* 0.775* 0.989 -5.106 2.090* 2.392**
(0.317) (0.424) (0.329) (0.335) (0.935) (1.815) (0.969) (1.053) (0.363) (0.574) (0.355) (0.337) (1.131) (4.206) (0.902) (0.728)
Rural 0.349* 0.304 0.841** 0.460** 0.395 -0.074 0.474* 0.826** 0.304 0.043 0.949** 1.465** 0.685 2.215** 1.221* 1.346*
(0.156) (0.335) (0.163) (0.171) (0.222) (0.418) (0.228) (0.240) (0.260) (0.511) (0.250) (0.229) (0.596) (0.831) (0.585) (0.566)
Constant 1.785** -3.362** -2.424** 2.535** 3.633** -24.132 0.550 4.426** 3.980** -2.930 1.912 6.417** 1.424 -13.325* -1.333 2.427
(0.569) (1.104) (0.613) (0.616) (0.945) (.) (0.958) (0.985) (1.018) (1.938) (0.982) (0.937) (2.763) (6.475) (2.674) (2.553)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-3 (continued)
(iv) Guyana
Educational Multinomial
Indo Men (N=1232) Afro Men (N=1116) Indo Women (N=1265) Afro Women (N=1308)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age 0.006 -0.008 0.142 -0.020 0.059 0.192** -0.007 -0.048 0.271 0.044 0.070 0.235**
(0.030) (0.039) (0.080) (0.047) (0.051) (0.063) (0.029) (0.043) (0.151) (0.034) (0.040) (0.056)
Age^2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Georgetown 0.094 0.610 -0.178 0.926 0.938 1.089 0.349 0.736 1.588 0.415 0.625 1.251*
(0.591) (0.628) (0.732) (0.687) (0.686) (0.732) (0.445) (0.517) (1.159) (0.492) (0.496) (0.578)
Rural -0.619 -1.084* -2.274** -0.246 -1.345** -1.418* -0.258 -0.437 -0.678 -0.536 -1.267** -0.397
(0.483) (0.522) (0.619) (0.496) (0.501) (0.570) (0.346) (0.418) (1.117) (0.403) (0.411) (0.510)
Constant 2.546** 2.400** -1.691 3.035** 2.250* -2.822* 2.789** 3.271** -7.470* 1.879* 2.261** -3.627**
(0.790) (0.918) (1.647) (1.019) (1.072) (1.364) (0.708) (0.901) (3.447) (0.802) (0.867) (1.196)
Demographic Multinomial
Indo Women (N=927) Afro Women (N=815)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.112** -0.190** -0.250** 0.260 -0.034 0.043 0.042 0.142* 0.055 0.195
(0.039) (0.045) (0.052) (0.203) (0.262) (0.042) (0.050) (0.069) (0.072) (0.144)
Age^2 0.001 0.001* 0.002** -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.003** -0.001 -0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Primary -0.453 -0.555* -0.613 -0.404 -0.815 -0.364 -1.742** -1.390* -1.728* -1.819*
(0.252) (0.278) (0.351) (0.582) (0.824) (0.626) (0.596) (0.680) (0.705) (0.830)
Secondary -0.283 -0.518 -0.482 -0.560 -32.077 -0.554 -1.923** -1.953** -2.259** -3.300**
(0.337) (0.358) (0.449) (0.726) (4344017) (0.652) (0.622) (0.707) (0.753) (0.963)
University -0.078 -0.558 -31.104 -31.099 -31.464 -0.278 -1.955** -2.643** -38.123 -38.432
(0.723) (0.906) (5303136) (8367188) (15581502) (0.685) (0.674) (0.837) (29.564) (41.077)
Georgetown 0.111 0.300 -0.585 -0.861 -0.440 -0.447 -0.536 -1.019** -1.303** -0.162
(0.411) (0.450) (0.620) (0.830) (1.456) (0.285) (0.303) (0.343) (0.500) (0.871)
Rural -0.113 -0.028 -0.193 -0.667 -0.515 -0.186 -0.433 -0.528 -0.145 0.807
(0.347) (0.385) (0.473) (0.602) (1.101) (0.282) (0.304) (0.327) (0.416) (0.787)
Constant 3.294** 5.585** 6.187** -3.227 1.310 0.333 2.255* 0.312 1.091 -2.230
(0.964) (1.039) (1.205) (3.569) (4.577) (1.075) (1.121) (1.449) (1.555) (2.737)Occupational Multinomial
Indo Men (N=1144) Afro Men (N=1026) Indo Women (N=1198) Afro Women (N=1229)
Variable Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee
Primary 1.799 0.555 0.320 18.290** 0.733 0.751 0.155 0.147 -0.475 0.105 -0.162 0.752
(1.120) (0.351) (0.299) (1.480) (0.573) (0.455) (0.698) (0.309) (0.322) (0.790) (0.563) (0.527)
Secondary 0.836 0.565 0.076 18.586** 0.630 0.895 0.837 0.030 0.634 0.580 0.139 1.245*
(1.271) (0.416) (0.354) (1.487) (0.611) (0.482) (0.787) (0.450) (0.368) (0.797) (0.586) (0.535)
University 2.498 0.867 0.832 18.639** 0.109 1.643** -31.513 -33.929 1.450* 0.584 -1.005 2.141**
(1.634) (0.730) (0.629) (1.773) (0.785) (0.594) (36282908) (20552719) (0.732) (1.008) (0.792) (0.580)
Age 0.004 0.345** 0.229** 0.265** 0.318** 0.331** 0.001 0.292** 0.213** 0.124 0.316** 0.272**
(0.103) (0.053) (0.040) (0.082) (0.048) (0.039) (0.103) (0.055) (0.050) (0.066) (0.059) (0.035)
Age^2 -0.001 -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.004** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Average age of hh -0.013 -0.025 -0.033** -0.023 -0.004 0.011 0.019 -0.029* -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007
(0.028) (0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009)
average # in hh w/no ed 1.638 2.080* 3.089** -228.203 -0.134 -0.172 -0.243 1.066 0.096 -2.252 0.876 0.805
(1.597) (0.820) (0.753) (14656729) (0.880) (0.710) (1.404) (0.690) (0.721) (1.596) (0.930) (0.645)
average # in hh w/pr ed 0.174 1.236 2.571** -0.003 0.619 0.083 -0.580 0.118 -0.038 -1.002 0.747 0.015
(1.421) (0.700) (0.651) (1.099) (0.638) (0.537) (1.263) (0.618) (0.612) (0.817) (0.574) (0.441)
average # in hh w/sec ed -2.434 1.611* 2.477** -0.608 0.655 0.146 -1.197 -0.611 -0.881 -1.411 0.223 0.352
(2.033) (0.719) (0.667) (1.050) (0.625) (0.518) (1.284) (0.638) (0.613) (0.781) (0.551) (0.410)
average # in hh w/ter ed 2.787 0.410 2.336* -0.817 0.310 -0.253 -109.375 1.087 0.754 -2.499* 0.659 0.204
(2.159) (1.393) (1.092) (1.495) (0.888) (0.694) (16379087) (0.923) (0.793) (1.247) (0.758) (0.514)
Number of children in hh -0.118 0.125 0.103 0.342** 0.185* 0.129 0.271 -0.107 -0.114 0.070 -0.003 -0.088
(0.229) (0.093) (0.083) (0.122) (0.083) (0.068) (0.139) (0.097) (0.085) (0.089) (0.073) (0.053)
Number of teens in hh -0.318 -0.234 -0.125 0.138 -0.171 -0.007 0.173 0.238 0.060 -0.006 0.035 0.085
(0.297) (0.125) (0.102) (0.168) (0.129) (0.095) (0.207) (0.124) (0.111) (0.141) (0.115) (0.079)
Number of adults in hh 0.096 -0.014 -0.098 -0.048 -0.108 -0.079 -0.127 -0.100 -0.174 0.204 -0.142 -0.052
(0.234) (0.102) (0.083) (0.145) (0.098) (0.067) (0.207) (0.113) (0.097) (0.107) (0.114) (0.066)
Number of elderly in hh 0.779 0.363 0.194 0.675 0.371 -0.085 -0.750 0.419 -0.544 0.390 -0.729 0.104
(0.527) (0.290) (0.234) (0.543) (0.305) (0.252) (0.775) (0.321) (0.365) (0.446) (0.494) (0.234)
Household head 1.429 2.299** 1.440** -1.039 1.898** 1.257** 1.336 0.509 0.018 -0.394 1.709** 0.147
(0.882) (0.407) (0.331) (0.677) (0.404) (0.320) (0.894) (0.455) (0.429) (0.569) (0.450) (0.273)
Spouse 0.839 1.066 -0.124 -33.298 0.131 0.340 -0.437 -0.708 -1.480** -0.778 0.129 -1.534**
(1.267) (0.596) (0.531) (9012395) (0.624) (0.455) (0.696) (0.373) (0.322) (0.452) (0.420) (0.240)
Georgetown 19.907** -0.585 -0.003 -0.598 0.386 0.417 -0.394 -0.033 0.852* -0.467 -0.139 0.250
(2.307) (0.501) (0.419) (0.420) (0.346) (0.265) (0.854) (0.465) (0.399) (0.339) (0.289) (0.213)
Rural 19.048** 0.115 0.048 -1.710** 0.908** 0.827** -0.419 -0.533 -0.384 -1.006** -0.323 0.098
(2.252) (0.418) (0.365) (0.508) (0.329) (0.257) (0.644) (0.384) (0.361) (0.362) (0.288) (0.215)
Constant -22.368 -7.989** -4.445** -22.831 -8.394** -6.935** -2.566 -6.328** -3.153** -2.702* -7.757** -5.945**
(.) (1.157) (0.926) (.) (1.113) (0.874) (1.928) (1.165) (0.999) (1.358) (1.226) (0.841)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level